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Abstract
We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce
activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets
an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that
forces a proportional reduction of the activity, and a proportional tax on it. For all
instruments the majority chooses levels which are too restrictive when the activity is
performed mainly by a small fraction of the population, and when costs for reducing
activities or paying taxes are su¢ cently convex. Also a majority may prefer an instru-
ment di¤erent than what a social planner would choose; for instance a rule when the
social planner would choose a tax.
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1 Introduction
Three ways of reducing the level of an activity generating negative externalities are routinely
used: a rule that sets an upper bound to this activity, a proportional tax on it, a compulsory
proportional reduction of the activity for everybody.1 This paper investigates which policy
and at what level would be chosen by majority voting. The latter does not deliver the
optimal policy choice for two reasons. First, for given policy instrument, majority voting
does not yield the optimal level of it. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, when choosing
amongst alternative instruments, majority voting in general does not lead to the choice of
the optimal one. For instance, the majority may choose a rule instead of a proportional tax
because a rule concentrates on the minority the burden of the reduction of the activity which
generates negative externalities. A social planner would instead choose a tax and, if he were
constrained to choose a rule, he would choose one which was more permissive than the one
chosen by the majority. We thus have a double distortion caused by voting. This case
arises when those who generate a negative externality are a minority. The opposite double
distortion occurs when the activity with negative externality is enjoyed by many. In this
case a social planner may choose a restrictive rule, while a majority may choose a lenient
tax.
These insights are consistent with the evidence that in many cases we observe regulation
while the optimal policy would be taxation, or vice versa. For example, in agriculture the
limits in the use of pesticides are quite frequent whereas taxes on them are less common.
In the case of air pollution, there is a sharp contrast between the use of taxes and the use
of emission standards. The latter are preferred when polluters are concentrated in specic
industries or plants, such as emissions of pollutants by power generation industries or by steel
and cement makers.2 Anti smoking regulations became very strict as the number of smokers
declined. We see low levels of taxation when the polluters are the majority; for instance low
1A fourth way of curbing negative externalities are tradeable permits. We do not study them in the
present paper, but we briey discuss them in the Conclusion.
2On November 22, 2010 the Wall Street Journal reported that since Mr. Obama took o¢ ce, the US Envi-
ronment Protection Agency (EPA) had proposed or nalized 29 major regulations and 172 major policy rules.
Requiring energy sources to install the best available control technology to limit greenhouse gas emissions,
would impose the electric industry costly capital expenditures to meet the increasingly strict burden.
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taxes on gasoline in the US or on heating fuel.3 Policymakers may choose quotas when tax
collection is costly or simply impossible, or because they are perceived as a fair method of
sharing the sacrices of curbing externalities (e.g. international agreements, like the Kyoto
protocol, or in many cases in the European Union).
We label our negative externality pollution for brevity. However our discussion of
instrument choice applies to many other policy issues, which may include construction rules,
speed limits, rules of behavior in communities like condominiums, prohibition (or very strict
regulation) of certain activities, from gambling to selling of organs, to prostitution to free
acquisition of guns and many others. Masciandaro and Passarelli (2013) apply the model of
the present paper to discuss issues of nancial regulation. Thus we believe that our model
is su¢ ciently general to be applied to a variety of di¤erent cases. In some of those, the
externality has the straightforward interpretation of monetary costs inicted on others. In
other cases, it may take the form of a negative utility costinicted on others, who engage
in certain activities which they nd objectionable, like gambling or prostitution. Baron
(2003) claims that moralisticgoals regarding how others should behave are prominent in
how people vote. Roth (2007) in his discussion of organ exchanges argues that repugnance
of certain transactions related to trades in organs, implies relevant social costs.
This is why we feel that it is appropriate to use a majority rule voting model. Much
of the literature on pollution strictly dened adopts lobbying models, as discussed in
the next section. While lobbying pressures are clearly important, especially for legislation
which a¤ects one particular sector, clearly decisions regarding the list of activities mentioned
above, from smoking to gun control etc., involve voting in legislatures or even in private
associations, e.g. ownersassociations. Our contribution is on the voting aspect of the issue
at hand, future research could merge the two approaches, lobbying and majority voting.4
Take, for instance, smoking regulations. Clearly the decision regarding smoking age, taxation
3According Parry and Small (2005) the optimal gasoline tax in the US is $1.01/gal, more than twice the
current rate. Lin and Prince (2009) nd that for California this tax should be $1.37/gal (over three times the
current level). The International Center for Technology Assessment computed that indirect costs to society
total around $12/gal. ($3.17 per liter; cf. www.icta.org).
Parry and Small (2005) also nd that the gasoline tax is above the socially optimal level in the UK.
4For a model which incorporates voting and lobbying, although not about externalities and instrument
choice, see Alesina and Tabellini (2008).
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over cigarettes etc., is inuenced by the lobby of the tobacco industry. But the fraction of
individuals smoking will also inuence the legislative choice regarding regulation and taxation
of smoking. The same applies to gun control: the gun lobby is strong but di¤erent states in
the US have di¤erent regulations as a function of the preferences of the voters.5
We should make clear from the outset that we consider only proportional taxes on the
polluting activities. By allowing any type of curvature on the tax schedule, including cor-
ners, one could reproduce patterns which approximate a rule, and are quite far from the
allocation generated by a proportional tax. In a positivepolitico economic model we need
to worry about the existence of a Condorcet winner. While we can prove its existence with
a proportional tax, in general one cannot do that with any curvature of the tax schedule.
Thus all of our positive results would be interpreted as comparing rules and quotas versus
a proportional tax on the polluting activities. Realistically speaking these are the kind of
policies routinely discussed in this area. We briey return to this issue in the conclusions.
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature.
In Section 3 we set up the basic model of the activity which produces negative externalities.
Then we study the majority vote equilibrium when the policy instrument is a rule (Section
4) a quota (Section 5) and a tax (Section 6). In Section 7 we study the choice of the policy
instrument by majority voting. Section 8 concludes and illustrates several extensions of the
model. All the proofs are in Appendix.
2 Review of the literature
The dilemma between regulation and taxation is old in the literature, but it has been tradi-
tionally posed in a normative context. The idea that the two instruments perform di¤erently
when uncertainty regards either costs or benets dates back to Weitzman (1974).
The literature which introduces political economy considerations in this area is conned
to environmental issues.6 Buchanan and Tullock (1975) compare environmental taxes with
a proportional reduction of polluting activities, which they dene regulation. There is no
5See Knight (2013) for a discussion of the e¢ cacy of such regulations.
6For a survey in favor or against environmental taxes and quantitative regulations, with some reference
to political economy issues, see Hepburn (2006).
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voting stage or any specication of the political process in their work. They o¤er several
arguments in favor of taxes, but they claim that people are more likely to prefer proportional
reductions. Congleton (1992) focuses on how political institutions a¤ect the enactment of
environmental regulations. Schneider and Volkert (1999) claim that di¤erentiated interests
between voters, politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats may lead to suboptimal instru-
ment choice or to ine¢ cient implementation.
We share an interest in the connection between redistributive policies and regulation with
Coate and Morris (1995), who claim that ine¢ cient environmental policies are frequently
adopted as redistribution schemes even when more e¢ cient redistribution instruments are
available. Fredriksson and Sterner (2005) argue that cleanrms may, somehow surpris-
ingly, according to their analysis, lobby in favor of higher taxes in order to benet from
larger refunds. Our majority voting model yields a similar result when the polluters are a
minority in the society. In fact this result is not surprising in a voting model.
Cremer, De Donder and Gahvari (2004) study the e¢ ciency of majority voting on an
environmental tax when the proceeds of the latter are used to reduce income and capital
taxes. If labor and capital taxes are rebated in the same proportion, the majority chooses
an environmental tax which is too low.7 MacKenzie and Onhorf (2012) argue that the
distributional conict is harsher with revenue-rising instruments (e.g. ecotaxes or tradeable-
permit auctions) than with non-revenue-raising instruments. In Kawara (2012) voters cannot
observe the type of politicians and the environmental damage. In a pooling equilibrium,
pro-industry politicians implement too low taxes in order to please polluters; in a separating
equilibrium pro-environmental politicians choose too high the tax in order to signal their
stand. Aidt (2010) argues that when income taxation is highly distortionary and the political
environment is highly competitive, the polluter group lobbies in favor of refunding all ecotax
revenues to citizens-voters.
A related strand of the environmental policy literature studies the instrument choice.8
We share with this literature the idea that, whenever regulation and taxes are available
policy options, majorities may prefer regulation to taxes even when the latter would be
7In a related work they consider the role of militants and opportunists within political parties (Cremer,
De Donder and Gahvari, 2008).
8For a survey, see Aidt (2013).
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socially optimal (cf. Keohane et al., 1998). Dijkstra (1998) claims that in the presence of
rent seeking taxes or other nancial instruments are rarely applied in environmental policy.
Damania (1999) shows that emission standards are more frequent when interest groups are at
work, whereas emission taxes are more likely when parties represent environmental interests.
In fact, we show that majority voting yields a di¤erent result: a majority of low polluters
has stronger incentive to adopt a strict standard, whereas a majority of large polluters would
be better o¤ with a tax. Aidt and Dutta (2004) study the transition from command-and-
control instruments, usually adopted when environmental targets are lax, towards either
an emission tax or tradeable permits. The latter are supported by the lobby of polluting
rms, the former is preferred by citizens, interested in tax rebates. We do not study neither
lobbies nor tradeable permits. However, a general insight is that as far as political distortion
is concerned, lobby models yield opposite results with respect to our majority voting model.
For example, a highly interested minority of polluters can be very e¢ cient in lobbying self-
interested politicians, and this can improve welfare. By contrast, under majority voting, the
minority is without any defense. As a result, political distortions under majority voting can
be larger than under lobbying, especially if the polluters (or the polluted) are quite a small
minority.
Our work is also related to a small literature which studies how voting rules a¤ect en-
vironmental policies. Fredriksson et al. (2010) look at the e¢ ciency of an environmental
tax that is implemented by a federal legislature. Boyer and La¤ont (1999) look at the op-
timal level of exibility that should be delegated to the majority. Di¤erent majorities have
di¤erent stakes in the rents of a polluting monopolist, and there is asymmetry in informa-
tion. Fluctuating majorities determine excessive uctuation in environmental policy. Thus
constitutional constraints may be desirable.
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3 The model
Our model is in the tradition of the political economy literature on redistributive scal
policy;9 but we focus upon rules and externalities. Consider a society with a continuum
of individuals/voters of size one; each individual has an exogenously given location in the
interval [0; 1]. Dene those locations types: ti for individual i. ti represents the behavior
that i can assume at no cost. A behavior di¤erent from ti entails for i an adjustment cost,
which depends on the distance between type ti and his behavior, denoted by bi. Types and
behaviors are constrained in the unit interval: ti; bi 2 [0; 1]. We can think of ti as the level
of the activity that maximizes prots (in case of a rm) or utility (in case of a consumer).
The adjustment cost function, c, is the same for all individuals:
c(jbi   tij) (1)
with c(0) = 0 and c0(0) = 0; c(:) > 0, c0(:) > 0, c00(:) > 0, 8bi 6= ti.10 Let "(bi) be the social
damage produced by an individual with behavior bi, with "0(bi) > 0 and "00(bi) > 0. If we
denote with G(b) the cumulative distribution of behaviors, the total (per capita) loss is:
 
Z 1
0
"(b)dG(b) (2)
For any behavioral prole G(b) everyone receives the same externality. The utility of
individual i, Ui, is given by the di¤erence between the total externality received and the
private adjustment cost:
Ui(G(b)) =  
Z 1
0
"(b)dG(b)  c(ti   bi) (3)
As it will become clear later an individual never has incentive to choose a behavior which
is higher than his type. This is why we suppressed the absolute value sign in the cost function
9This literature was pioneered by Roberts (1977), Romer (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). For a
survey, see Persson and Tabellini (2000).
10The simpifying assumption that c0(0) = 0 avoids corner solutions, but does not alter in any way the
nature of our results.
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of (3). Thus, hereafter ti  bi, 8i. Each individual is innitely small, thus he does not take
into account his own e¤ect on the aggregate level of negative externality. Then if F (t) is the
cumulative distribution of types, in an unregulated economy without policy intervention,
Ui(F (t)) =  
Z 1
0
"(t)dF (t)
There is scope for policy intervention: we consider in turn rules, quotas and taxes.
4 Voting on a rule
A rule xes an upper bound, , to the behavior of all individuals. The timing is as follows:
rst, individuals vote on the rule in pairwise comparisons, and then they choose their be-
havior as a function of the rule chosen by majority rule, namely ^ (fully enforced). All types
higher than ^ have to adjust and pay the cost; all types below (or equal to) ^ can adopt
their preferred behavior at no costs. Any individual knows that, by voting for a rule , he
a¤ects the behavior of 1   F () individuals whose types are above , and can benet from
the reduction of their negative externalities. However, if  is lower than his type, he has to
bear a private adjustment cost. The individual indirect utility function can be then written
as
Vi() =  "()  (1  F ()) 
Z 
0
"(t)dF (t)  Ii()  c(ti   ) (4)
where Ii() = 1 if ti >  and Ii() = 0 if ti  . The rst term in the RHS of (4) is the
externality produced by all the a¤ected individuals (i.e. those with t > ); the second term
is the externality produced by the non-a¤ected individuals below ; the third term is is
private compliance cost, which is di¤erent from zero only if ti > .
Call i the most preferred rule, or is bliss point. If 

i 2 (0; ti), it solves the following
FOC:
  (1  F ())  "0() =  c0(ti   ) (5)
Equation (5) shows that the most preferred rule for voter i is the one which equalizes the
marginal benet of a¤ecting the behavior of 1  F (i) individuals to the marginal cost due
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to complying with the rule. Nobody would prefer a rule higher than his type. Moreover,
because of c0(0) = 0, an individual always prefers a rule that is strictly lower than his
type: i 2 [0; ti). If F (:) is su¢ ciently smooth overall, the SOC is satised.11 Thus
any individual i has a uniquely preferred rule and a Condorcet winner exists (Black, 1948).
Moreover, lower types prefer lower rules:
Lemma 1 For any two individuals i and j, if ti > tj, then i  j .
Call tm the median type and let m be his bliss point. By Lemma 1, under majority rule
the voting outcome, ^, is the bliss point of the median type: ^ = m.
The socially optimal rule  in general di¤ers from the voting outcome, ^. In fact 
maximizes the following social welfare schedule, W (), that is the sum of all individuals
indirect utilities:
W () =  "()  (1  F ()) 
Z 
0
"(t)dF (t) 
Z 1

c(t  )dF (t)
If the solution is interior, the following FOC pins down :
  (1  F ())  "0() =  ac0() (6)
where ac0() =
R 1

c0(t  )dF (t)+ c(t  )f() represents the average marginal cost over the
entire population.12
We label a rule as too restrictive if ^ < ; it is too permissive if ^ > .
Proposition 1 i)The majority chooses a rule which is too restrictive if and only if at the
point ^ the medians marginal cost is lower than the average. ii)The majority chooses a rule
which is too permissive if and only if at the point ^ the medians marginal cost is higher than
the average.
11The second order derivative of Vi() is  "00(i)  (1  F (i))+ "0(i)  f(i)  c00(ti  i). By su¢ ciently
smoothwe mean that the second term (which is positive) is small, so that the second order derivative is
negative overall.
12To be precise, ac0() > 0 is the average cost of a marginal decrease in .
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Two factors determine whether a rule is too restrictive or not and of how much. First,
if the cost function is very convex, the median votersmarginal cost may be substantially
lower than the average. Second, if the median voter is a low type, lowering the rule is highly
benecial for him since he can a¤ect the behavior of many individuals with a relatively
limited personal adjustment cost.
5 Voting on a quota
We now analyze a policy which requires a reduction of the activity by a proportion  2 [0; 1]
that we call quota.13 Once  has been decided by the majority, any individual i has to
lower his behavior from ti to bi = (1  )  ti. Thus:
Vi() =  
Z 1
0
"((1  )  t)dF (t)  c(ti) (7)
Vi() is concave, and each voters most preferred quota, 

i , is negatively related to his type.
Under majority rule, the chosen policy is the one most preferred by the median: ^ = m.
In the voting equilibrium,
a"(^) = c(^tm) (8)
where a"() =
R 1
0
"0((1   )t)tdF (t) is the (positive per capita) marginal externality pro-
duced, after the quota has been enforced; c(tm) = tm  c0(tm) is the medians marginal
cost.14
The social welfare function is:
W () =  
Z 1
0
"((1  )t)dF (t) 
Z 1
0
c(t)dF (t)
13Examples of quotas include the 20-20-20plan of emission reduction adopted by the European Union
in 2007 or the Californias tailpipe standards which require a 30% reduction in emissions from new cars by
2016.
14We are considering interior solutions. There might be corner bliss points, i = 1, which are likely to
concern low types, large externalities and low marginal costs.
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W () is concave and the social optimum, , satises:
a"(
) = ac(
) (9)
Again, social optimum is reached where the marginal benet from a quota, a"(), equals
the average marginal cost, ac() =
R 1
0
c0(t)tdF (t).
As for the case of rules we dene a quota as too restrictive if  >  and too permissive
if  < .
Proposition 2 i) The majority chooses a quota which is too restrictive (too permissive) if
and only if in equilibrium the median voters marginal cost is lower (higher) than the average
marginal cost. ii) If the adjustment cost function is linear, a median in the average position
chooses the social optimum.
6 Voting on a tax
We now examine a proportional tax on polluting activities (tax for brevity).15 Tax revenues
can either be redistributed or used to provide public goods or to rebate other taxes. Here
we analyze the case of lump sum redistribution. As above, voters rst choose the optimal
level of the policy (the tax rate in this case), then they choose their behavior and pay their
taxes. Let  be the tax rate (  0) so that the tax burden for individual i is   bi. The
government budget is balanced:
R 1
0
  b(t; )dF (t) =   b, where b = b() is the after-tax
average behavior in the society. Each individual receives a transfer of   b(). We assume
that utility is quasi-linear in income.16 Thus the net cost that i bears from paying the tax
15Examples are the so-called ecotaxes, intended to promote ecologically sustainable activities. Environ-
mental taxes target a broad array of bases (e.g. fertilizer, pesticides, plastic bags, landll waste, batteries,
etc.). Taxes on motor fuels and vehicles represent almost 90% of the revenue from environmentally related
taxes in Europe. In the US motor fuel taxes remain substantially below the European levels. Revenues from
federal environmentally related taxes represent 3.5% of total tax revenues, compared to an average of 7% for
the OECD countries (OECD (2011): Database on Instruments Used for Envirnmental Policy and Natural
Resources Management).
16Under quasi-linearity there is no endowment e¤ect of paying taxes. We do not include any individual
income or wealth in the model since no result would change.
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when his behavior is bi is  
 
bi   b

. Given a behavior prole G(b) and a tax  , individual
utility is:
Ui =  
Z 1
0
"(b)dF (t)  c(ti   bi)   
 
bi   b

Individuals choose after-tax behavior in order to minimize costs: bi 2 argmin
~bi
n
c(ti   ~bi) +   (~bi   b))
o
.
Therefore, individual behavior satises the optimality condition, c0(ti   bi) =  ,17 or:
bi = ti   r() (10)
where r()  c0 1(), with r0  0 and r00  0 . Thus, is indirect preferences for the tax rate
are:
Vi() =  
Z 1
0
"(t  r())dF (t)  c(r())    (ti   t) (11)
where t is the average type. The following FOC pins down agent is bliss point  i :
a" = c
0
 + (ti   t) (12)
where a" =
R 1
0
"0r0f(t)dt is the per capita private marginal benet from externality reduction
and the RHS is the private marginal cost of reducing behavior and paying (net) taxes. The
SOC is satised thanks to the convexity of " and c, which ensure that Vi() is concave. By
implicit di¤erentiation of (12), we get @ =@ti = (a"   c ) 1 < 0.18 This means that
higher types want lower tax rates. Bliss points monotonicity and the concavity of Vi()
are su¢ cient to say that the voting equilibrium, ^ , is the medians most preferred tax rate,
^ =  m. In equilibrium,
a" = c + (tm   t) (13)
The policy benchmark maximizes the following social preference function, subject to (10)
17The SOC is satised thanks to the convexity of c. Here we assume that optimal after-tax behavior is
interior for all i.
18Consider that a" =
R 1
0
  "00r02 + "0r00 f(t)dt < 0.
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for all i:19
W () =  
Z 1
0
"(b( ; t))dF (t)  c(r())
Of course also W () is concave; thus the socially optimal tax,  , is computed from the
following equation:
a" = c (14)
The social planner would choose a tax such that per-capita marginal benets are equal to
per-capita (or average) marginal costs. Compare (12) with (14). The voting equilibrium
coincides with the social optimum when the median type is also the average type. A median
that pollutes less than the average chooses too high a tax, and vice versa.
As for the case of a rule and a quota, we label a tax as too permissive if  <   or too
restrictive if  >  .
Proposition 3 i) A tax is too restrictive if and only if the median type is lower than the
average type. ii) A tax is too permissive if and only if the median type is higher than the
average type.
Di¤erently from the other two instruments, the convexity of adjustment costs does not
a¤ect the political distortion. Independently of c00, the policy outcome is optimal as soon as
tm = t. This result, which perfectly parallels the classical result by Meltzer and Richards
(1981) in public nance, is a consequence of quasi-linearity of the utility function.20
7 The choice of a policy instrument
7.1 Preliminaries: comparing instruments
7.1.1 Taxes vs rules
A rule imposes all the costs of the reduction of the externality only on types above the
threshold. A tax distributes these costs more evenly. In fact, for any amount of externality
19Observe that by the balaced budget constraint, the average net cost of paying taxes is zero.
20Supplementary Material, available from the authors, presents a more general model in which taxes are
used to provide public goods and.preferences are not quasi-linear.
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reduction, a low median pays relatively more with a tax than with a rule. As a consequence,
a low median has a stronger tendency to prefer a restrictive rule rather than a tax. For the
same reason, a high median has a stronger incentive to choose a tax that is socially too low.
This incentive asymmetry yields the following:
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, i) a tax cannot be too restrictive whenever a rule is too
permissive;
ii) a tax may be too permissive when a rule is too restrictive.
Proposition 4 yields the general idea that whenever a democratic society adopts rules
instead of taxes, it does so because it wants to impose very restrictive behavior on a mi-
nority of polluters. This result holds for any given externality or cost function, and any
distribution of types.
7.1.2 Rules vs quotas
The comparison of rules versus quotas is similar to that of rules versus taxes. If a majority
chooses a quota that is socially too restrictive it cannot choose a rule that is too permissive.
As in the previous subsection, rules that are imposed by majority are always more likely to
be too restrictive compared to quotas.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, i) a quota cannot be too restrictive whenever a rule is too
permissive;
ii) a quota may be too permissive when a rule is too restrictive.
7.1.3 Taxes vs quotas
With a tax, the tax burden is shared proportionally, whereas with a quota the costs are more
concentrated on high types. As a consequence, other things being equal, the median never
chooses a quota that is too permissive when he would choose a tax that is too restrictive, or
socially optimal.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium i) a tax cannot be too restrictive whenever a quota is too
permissive.
ii) A tax may be too permissive when a quota is too restrictive.
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7.2 The majoritys choice
The decision takes place in two stages. In the rst stage a majority chooses the instrument; in
the second stage a possibly di¤erent majority chooses the level. Voters in the rst stage know
that, whatever the instrument, the outcome of the second stage will be the level preferred
by the median, i.e. m, 

m or 

m. They compare their indirect utilities in those three cases,
and choose which instrument to vote for. We show below that a Condorcet winner always
exists.
7.2.1 Rule vs Tax
Individual j prefers the rule if his utility is higher: Vj(m)  Vj( m). Low types tend to
prefer a rule. They have zero (or little) adjustments to make with a rule. Moreover a rule
produces more benets since it concentrates reductions on top polluters. Lemma 2 below
shows that when the costs of the externalities are su¢ ciently convex then all types under a
given level, that we call t1, prefer the rule, and all types above t1 prefer the tax. The intuition
can be found in Figure 1.1, where C(m; t) is the private cost of the rule as a function of
type, and C ( m; t) is the cost of the tax,
C(m; t) =
(
c(t  m) for t > m
0 for t  m
C ( m; t) = 

m  t
In the gure, a term A has been added to the latter cost function. This term represents the
di¤erence between the benets of the rule and the benets of the tax (see Appendix for the
denition of A). Since benets are the same for all, A is constant in t. If externalities are
su¢ ciently convex, a rule is more e¤ective in curbing externalities, thus A is positive, a sort
of opportunity cost that, if one chooses a tax, must be added to the cost of a tax.21 Observe
that t1 is determined by the intersection between the two curves. Of course, if the median is
to the left of t1 the majority chooses the rule, otherwise the majority prefers the tax. Thus
21By (4) and (11), and using the denition of A in Appendix (cf. proof of Lemma 2), it is easy to see that
Vj(

m) > Vj(

m) if and only if C(

m; t) < C (

m; t) +A.
15
*
mr0 types
Costs
AtC m +),(
*t
1t
),( * tC mr
A
1. Rule vs Tax
0
Costs
DtC m +),(
*t
3t
),( * tC mq
D
3. Quota vs Tax
*
mr0
Costs
BtC m +),(
*q
2t
),( * tC mr
B
2. Rule vs Quota
types
types
Figure 1: Pairwise comparisons between instruments
we will need to know if t1 is above or below the median.
7.2.2 Rule vs Quota
Individual j prefers a rule if utility is higher: Vj(m)  Vj(m). Lemma 2 shows that if
externalities are su¢ ciently convex, all types under a level t2 prefer the rule and all types
above that level prefer the quota. Thus, also when compared to a quota, a rule is preferred
by low types. The reason is the same, a rule forces top polluters to drastic reductions and it
is cheap for low polluters.
Figure 1.2, shows that t2 comes out of the intersection between the cost of the rule,
C(m; t), and C(

m; t)+B, which is the cost of the quota, plus a constant B that represents
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the additional benets of the rule.22
7.2.3 Quota vs Tax
Low types prefer the quota when externalities are su¢ ciently convex; in particular, there
exists a t3 such that 8j with tj  t3, Vj(m)  Vj( m) and 8j with tj > t3, Vj( m) > Vj(m).
The idea is that since a tax obliges everyone to the same behavioral reduction it is less
e¤ective than a quota in curbing high typesexternalities. If " is su¢ ciently convex, then
low types prefer the quota, despite they have to give up tax transfers.
Figure 1.3 shows that the preference of low types for the quota can be drawn by comparing
the cost of the quota, C(m; t), with C (

m; t) +D; i.e. the cost of the tax plus a constant
D which represents the additional benets of a quota.23
7.2.4 Condorcet winners
The instrument choice at the rst stage will depend on the position of the median with
respect to t1, t2 and t3. Of course we do not know much about the orderings in which t1,
t2 and t3 may occur. All the arguments above regarding pairwise instrument choice can be
summarized in the following lemma proven in Appendix.24
Lemma 2 If the externality function is su¢ ciently convex, then t1; t2 and t3 exist and are
unique. The only two orderings that do not violate transitivity of preferences for any voter
are a and b in Figure 7.2.4.
7.2.5 Ordering a
Clearly the position of the median is the key issue. Suppose that tm  t3. and thus tm  t1.
The majority prefers a rule when posed against the tax. Also since tm  t2, the majority
22Specically,
C (m; t) = c(

m  t)
and B is dened in Appendix. By (4) and (7), Vj(m) > Vj(

m) , C(m; t) < C(m; t) +B.
23D is dened in Appendix. By (7) and (11), Vj(

m) > Vj(

m) , C(m; t) < C (m; t) +D.
24Hereafter we assume that Lemma 2 holds. Cases in which this lemma does not apply are discussed in
the Supplementary Material available from the authors upon request.
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prefers the rule against the quota. The rule wins. Instead a tax wins if t1 < tm  t2, or
tm > t2: Thus under ordering a, the rule is voted when the median is a low polluter and the
tax is voted when the medial pollutes a lot. The quota is never chosen..
But when does ordering a occur? The graphical intuition for the answer can be found in
Figure 1. Ordering a requires that t3 is small compared to t1 and t2. Roughly speaking, A
and B have to be rather large, compared to D. Recall that A and B represent the relative
advantage of a rule with respect to a tax and a quota, respectively. Since a rule forces top
polluters to larger reductions, this relative advantage of the rule is big when externalities are
quite convex. In fact the Appendix proves that:
Proposition 7 When externalities are quite convex ordering a occurs. In this case:
i) the majority chooses a rule if the median is a low type (tm  t1);
ii) the majority chooses a tax if the median is high type (tm > t1).
iii) A quota is never chosen.
7.2.6 Ordering b
Ordering b occurs with a low B, a high D, and a moderately high A. A low B means that
the advantage of the rule over the quota is small. Thus "00 has to be low. A high D means
that the advantage of the quota over the tax is large (low utility from transfers compared to
the benets from curbing externalities). When "00 is low, externalities grow rather linearly
with behavior. A proportional quota performs well. Summing up:
Proposition 8 When externalities are not too convex ordering b occurs. In this case:
i) the majority chooses a rule if the median is a low type (tm  t2);
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ii) the majority chooses a tax if the median is high type (tm > t3);
iii) the majority chooses a quota if the median is an intermediate type (t2 < tm  t3).
7.3 Deviations from optimality
Suppose that the median is lowand costs are quite convex. According to Propositions 7
and 8 the majority chooses a rule. Due to convexity of the costs, the level of rule set at the
second voting stage is too restrictive because high types pay too much. In this case a social
planner maximizing average utility would choose a tax, which shares costs more evenly.
Proposition 9 If the social planner would choose a tax and the majority prefers a rule, the
chosen rule is more restrictive than what a social planner would choose if he were restricted
to use a rule.
The idea is that when polluting activities are concentrated in a minority of high types
and costs are su¢ ciently convex, the majority chooses a sub-optimal instrument, namely a
rule rather than a tax, and the wronglevel of the instrument. Suppose instead that the
majority enjoysthe polluting activity, namely the median is a high type. By Propositions
7 and 8, the majority prefers a tax which by Proposition 3, is too permissive. However, if
cost convexity is low the social planner would choose the rule.
Proposition 10 If the social planner prefers a rule and the majority prefers a tax, the
outcome is a tax which is too permissive, namely the tax is lower than what a social planner
would choose if he were restricted to use a tax.
These propositions suggest a relationship between the choice of the instrument and the
nature of the political distortion. When the activities that cause externalities are mainly
due minorities, we observe overly restrictive rules. If the externalities derive from activities
enjoyed by the majority, then the choice will be taxes which are too permissive.
8 Conclusion
We have examined the political economy of how to curb activities which generate negative
externalities. Our main result can be summarized in a double distortion. Under certain
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conditions, when the individuals producing a negative externality (broadly dened) are a
relatively small minority, the voters would choose a rule while a social planner would choose
a tax. In addition, the rule chosen by the majority is more restrictive than the level that the
social planner would choose if constrained to use a rule as his only instrument. Conversely,
when the activity with negative externality is enjoyed by many, majority voting would select
a tax even when a social planner would choose a rule. In this case, the tax chosen by majority
voting would be lower than the level that the social planner would choose if he were restricted
to use a tax as his only policy instrument.25 The majority chooses a quota only for a small
set of parameter values and the quota is generally, but not always, dominated by a rule or
a tax. This opens the question of why quotas are so broadly used in practice.
One could explore several extensions. First, we have not studied tradeable permits in
this paper. The political economy aspects would concern the assignment of property rights
(i.e. the rights to pollute), which crucially determines who can sell permits and who needs
to buy them.26 Second, some activities with negative externalities (but not all) impose cost
on future generations who do not vote, at least not directly except for the intergenerational
altruism. Third, one could extend the analysis to more sophisticated tax schedules allowing
for some curvature in the tax rate. Our hunch is that when the population is concentrated
on low types the majority would choose a more progressivetax than the social planner.
Fourth, thus far we have imposed that rules and quotas are self enforcing. This equilibrium
is equivalent to assuming perfect monitoring (or imperfect monitoring with such a high ne if
caught that nobody cheats in equilibrium). In reality, rules can be broken. The social choice
involves a certain amount of investment in costly monitoring activities and the selection of
a ne. The revenue from the ne could be used to nance monitoring and, if anything is left
over, to provide public goods. With imperfect monitoring and a ne, individual polluters
25This possibly explains why motor fuel taxation is too low, as discussed earlier. This is also consistent
with the recent debate on obesity policies, which is a major concern in the US compared to Europe. What
we observe is that the EU prefers regulation (e.g. more standards on fat contents, clearer food labelling,
improving the nutritional content of school and o¢ ce meals). According to this model, the reason is that
obese people are a minority (at least for now) in Europe. The US is more oriented toward soft taxation,
possibly because obese people are a larger share of the population. In fact, in the US Congress there have
been recent proposals for an obesity tax, which is expected to be low compared to social costs.
26Aidt and Dutta (2004) use a lobby model to explain the transition from command-and-control instru-
ments to tradeable permits.
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would choose how much to pollute and how much risk of being caught is worth taking.
This would lead to a less sharp distinction between a rule (or a quota) and a tax. The
fth extension relates to voting rules. In our model any possible form of tyranny does not
come from direct expropriation of the minority but rather from the fact that, within the
political process, the majority ignores the costs incurred by the minority. This may result
in decisions that are too costly from a social viewpoint. If for example the medians policy
were too restrictive, e¢ ciency would be enhanced by giving the minority of high types some
amount of blocking power. This is frequently done by adopting super-majorities.27 The
problem is that a super-majority assigns blocking power not only to high types, but also to
low types. If the objective is avoiding that the median is the pivot, a super-majority may not
work. A potential alternative is giving the minority more voting weight.28 The idea is simple:
when the medians policy is too restrictive we must shift the pivottowards a higher type,
whose bliss point is at the socially e¢ cient level. The issue here is not equity: assigning more
power to the most concerned individuals in order to counter balance the power of the least
concerned ones improves e¢ ciency. Implementation problems of such schemes are, however,
extremely severe.
27Literature on super-majorities is vast and belongs to the normative analysis of constitutions. The focus
is mainly on distributional issues (see Mueller (2003) for an extensive survey). Aghion and Bolton (2003)
suggest that, when preferences are not single-peaked, higher super-majorities lower the risk of Condorcet
cycles, but also lower the chance of circumventing ex-post vested interests; the solution of this trade-o¤
yields the optimal majority threshold. Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000) argue that super-majority rules may
reduce compromise; as a consequence, the incidence of majority tyranny may increase. Aghion, Alesina and
Trebbi (2004) analyze the constitutional choice about the level of super-majority needed to block policies
of elected political leaders. Di Giannatale and Passarelli (2013) argue that, compared to weighted votes, a
system based on the probability of being selected for voting generates less political distortion.
28The literature on weighted voting is possibly less developed, and mostly concerned with problems of
equal representation in indirect democracies. Barbera and Jackson (2006) suggest a mixture of weights and
super-majority that allows sticking with the status quo, unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast
for change.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof. Lemma 1. Implicit di¤erentiating (5) at the point i 2 (0; 1] yields, for any i,
@i
@ti
=   c
00(ti   i )
 "00  (1  F (i )) + "0  f(i )  c00(ti   i )
(15)
The denominator in the RHS of (15) is the second derivative of Vi(), which is negative
by assumption. Thus the sign of @

i
@ti
is positive, since c00(ti   i ) > 0. In case of a corner
solution, the above derivative is zero. The relationship between type and bliss point is weakly
monotone. QED.
Proof. Proposition 1. Recall that  solves (6) and that ac0() is decreasing in , and
that, by the concavity of W (), (1  F ())  "0() < ac0() for any  < . Consider a too
restrictive rule: ^ = m < 
. We have that
(1  F (m))  "0(m) < ac0(m)
and
(1  F (m))  "0(m) = c0(tm   m)
Therefore,
c0(tm   m) < ac0(m)
or,
c0(tm   m)
ac0(m)=(1  F (m))
< 1  F (m)
where ac0(m)=(1  F (m)) is the average marginal cost computed over the a¤ected popula-
tion.
Equivalently, the condition for a too permissive rule is the following:
c0(tm   m)
ac0(m)=(1  F (m))
> 1  F (m)
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QED.
Proof. Proposition 2. i) By the convexity of c(:), it follows that ac is increasing in
. Moreover, by the concavity of W (), a"() < ac() for any  > 
. Let us consider the
case of a too restrictive quota, ^ > . By (8) and (9) we have:
a"(^) < ac(^)
and
a"(^) = c(^tm)
Therefore,
c(^tm)
ac(^)
< 1
The vice versa holds for a too permissive quota.
ii) Let t be the average type. When the adjustment cost function is linear, c(t) = k  t
(where k is a positive parameter), then marginal costs are linear in t: c(t) = k  t. In this
case, if tm = t, then ac(^) = c(^tm) = k  t. A median in the average position chooses the
social optimum. By Jensens inequality, if c00(t) > 0, then c(^t) < ac(^), then the quota
is too restrictive even if tm = t. QED.
Proof. Proposition 3. The proof is trivial thus we omit it.
Proof. Proposition 4. Suppose that tm = t and consider the worst case in which
cost convexity is very low. Say c00 = , where  is a very low positive constant. In this case,
c0(t   ) =   (t   ). We know that with tm = t the tax is optimal (Proposition 3). We
have to show that the rule is too restrictive. At the equilibrium point ^, the medians and
the average marginal costs are the following :
- c0(tm   ^) =   (tm   ^)
- ac0(^) =
R 1
^
  (t  ^)dF (t) =   ~t  (1  F (^))^, where ~t is the average type in [^; 1].
Observe that ~t > t and (1  F (^))^ < ^. Therefore,
c0(tm   ^)
ac0(^)
=
  (tm   ^)
  ~t  (1  F (^))^ < 1
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The rule is too restrictive (Proposition 1). Despite convexity is very low, even a median who
is in the average (i.e. tm = t) chooses too restrictive a rule. In general, with any degree of
cost convexity, one can nd a distribution with a median below the average who chooses too
restrictive a rule, whereas, by Proposition 3 this is not possible when the instrument is a
tax. QED.
Proof. Proposition 5. If an interior rule is too permissive, then
c0(tm   ^)
ac0(^)
> 1
We want to show that in this case also the quota chosen by the majority is too permissive;
i.e.
c(^tm)=ac(^) > 1
Consider that ac0(^) is an average in which the only non-zero elements are the (1   F (^))
marginal costs of the a¤ected people above F (^); where 1 F (^) > 0:5. Moreover 50% of the
elements in ac0(^) are larger than c0(tm  ^). Further consider that in equilibrium the median
has stronger incentive to bear private costs when a rule is adopted, thus c0(tm  ^) > c(^tm).
Thus, with a quota the medians marginal cost is lower. We now show that also the average
is lower, but it decreases by a larger amount.
Split the population in two sets: the 50% above the median and the 50% below the median.
With a quota, all individuals in the rst set lower their behavior, and at most all individuals
in the second set increase their behavior. However, the behavior reduction of any individual
in the rst set is larger than the behavior increase of the individuals in the second set (since
the quota a¤ects behavior proportionally). By cost convexity, it follows that the marginal
costs of all individuals in the rst set decrease on average by a larger amount with respect
of the marginal cost increase in the second set. Thus the average marginal cost over the
entire population decreases. Moreover, the average decrease in the rst set is larger than the
decrease in the medians marginal cost, and the average increase in the second set is smaller.
Thus, when a quota instead of a rule is adopted, the marginal cost over the entire population,
ac(), decreases by a larger amount than the medians marginal cost, c(^tm). This implies
that if c0(tm   ^) > ac0(^) then ac() cannot be larger that the medians marginal cost,
24
c(tm). QED.
Proof. Proposition 6. By Propositions 2 and 4, if c00 > 0 and utility is quasi-linear,
then tm > t is a su¢ cient condition for a too permissive tax whereas it is not su¢ cient for a
too permissive quota. Thus we might have cases in which the tax is too permissive and the
quota is too restrictive, but the vice versa is impossible. QED.
Proof. Lemma 2. The rst part of the proof consists of showing that the crossing
points of curves C (m; t), C(

m  t) and C (m; t) are as represented in Figure 1. We do this
in two steps. First, we show that for su¢ ciently convex externality functions A, B, and D
are positive. Second, we show that, given m, 

m; and 

m, C (

m; t) is steeper than C(

m  t)
and C (m; t) for a su¢ ciently large t, and C(

m; t) is steeper than C (

m; t) for any t.
Specically, A, B, and D are the following:
A =

 "(m)  (1  F (m)) 
Z m
0
"(t)dF (t)

 
 

 
Z 1
0
"(t  r( m))dF (t)  c(r( m)) +  m  t

B =

 "(m)  (1  F (m)) 
Z m
0
"(t)dF (t)

 
 

 
Z 1
0
"((1  m)t)dF (t)

and
D =

 
Z 1
0
"((1  m)t)dF (t)

 
 

 
Z 1
0
"(t  r( m))dF (t)  c(r( m)) +  m  t

Observe that when "00 is large enough the rst squared brackets in A, B, and D are larger
than the second ones. The reason is the same: a rule forces high types to larger adjustments
with respect to the other two instruments; and a quota does the same, with respect to a tax.
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With su¢ ciently large "00, these e¤ects overcome the benets of the transfers in A and D.
Therefore A, B and D are larger than zero.
Let us consider the second step. The cost functions are the following:
C(m; t) =
(
c(t  m) for t > m
0 for t  m
, C ( m; t) = 

m  t, C (m; t) = c(m  t)
The derivatives are the following:
@C(m; t)
@t
=
(
c0(:) for t > m
0 for t  m
,
@C ( m; t)
@t
=  m,
@C (m; t)
@t
= c0(:)  m
Since m < 1, then for a su¢ ciently large t > 

m,
@C(m;t)
@t
> @C(

m;t)
@t
. Moreover, for any
su¢ ciently large t, @C(

m;t)
@t
> @C(

m;t)
@t
and @C(

m;t)
@t
< @C(

m;t)
@t
. Then, t1, t2 and t3 are positive
and unique.
The second part of the proof consists of showing that any ordering other than a and b violate
transitivity conditions. The full set of possible orderings is as follows:
Ordering a: t3 < t1 < t2 Ordering b: t2 < t1 < t3
Ordering c: t3 < t2 < t1 Ordering d: t1 < t3 < t2
Ordering e: t1 < t2 < t3 Ordering f : t2 < t3 < t1)
i) Ordering c. Take an individual j with type tj 2 (t2; t1]. He prefers the rule to the tax;
the quota to the rule; the tax to the quota. His preferences clearly do not meet transitivity.
Ordering c is impossible. Applying the same argument, one can easily see that:
ii) Ordering d cannot occur because preferences of types in (t1; t3] are not transitive.
iii) Ordering e cannot occur because preferences of types in (t1; t2] are not transitive.
iv) Ordering f cannot occur because preferences of types in (t3; t1] are not transitive.
QED.
Proof. Proposition 7. By Lemma 2, it is easy to see that when externalities are
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quite convex, A and B are large, compared to D. Thus ordering a occurs. In this case, the
majority choice is the following:
- a:1, if tm  t3, then Rule  Tax, Rule  Quota, and Quota  Tax ! Rule wins.
- a:2, if t3 < tm  t1, then Rule  Tax, Rule  Quota and Tax  Quota ! Rule wins.
- a:3, if t1 < tm  t2, then Tax  Rule, Rule  Quota and Tax  Quota ! Tax wins.
- a:4, if tm > t2, then Tax  Rule, Quota  Rule and Tax  Quota ! Tax wins.
Thus under ordering a the rule is voted when the median is a low polluter and the tax is
voted when the medial pollutes a lot. The quota never comes about. QED.
Proof. 8. Externalities are su¢ ciently convex, so that Lemma 2 holds. However, if
convexity is not too high, B is relatively small wrt A and D. In this case ordering b occurs.
Then, the majority choice is the following:
- b:1, if tm  t2, then Rule  Tax, Rule  Quota, and Quota  Tax ! Rule wins.
- b:2, if t2 < tm  t1, then Rule  Tax, Quota  Rule and Quota  Tax ! Quota wins.
- b:3, if t1 < tm  t3, then Tax  Rule, Quota  Rule and Quota  Tax ! Quota wins.
- b:4, if tm > t3, then Tax  Rule, Quota  Rule and Tax  Quota ! Tax wins.
The quota then is an equilibrium when the median is in an intermediate position and he is
not strongly distorted toward a tax or a rule. QED.
Proof. Proposition 9. The social planner prefers a tax to a rule when externality
convexity is low and cost convexity is high. With low convexity of ", ordering b occurs and
Propositions 1 and 8 apply: a majority with a low median chooses a rule and the rule is very
restrictive. Due to high cost convexity, there is a large di¤erence between the average and
the median marginal costs. Then the medians choice is quite di¤erent from to the rule level
that would be socially optimal. This causes a large welfare loss. QED.
Proof. Proposition 10. The social planner prefers a rule when externality convexity
is high and cost convexity is low. If "00 is high, Proposition 7 applies (i.e. ordering a occurs).
A majority with a high median chooses a tax. By Proposition 3, if tm > t, the level is too
low. QED.
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